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A Short Commentary
Does purely physical information have meaning? A comment on Carlo Rovelli’s paper
“Meaning=information + evolution”
Roman Krzanowski
Pontifical University of John Paul II, Cracow, Poland
The note discusses the concept of meaningful, physical information pre-
sented by Carlo Rovelli. It points out certain consequences of the infor-
mation model not elucidated in the original paper but important to its
comprehensive understanding.
Information is mostly perceived as an ab-
stract idea that is closely associated with
knowledge, cognition, or communication. It
has meaning, intentionality, and purpose, and
its presence depends upon the existence of a
cognitive agent. Information may also be re-
garded as a concrete, physical phenomenon.
Such information does not need an agent to
exist, but it has no meaning, purpose, or in-
tentionality. So how can information be, at
the same time, abstract and endowed with
meaning while also being concrete and phys-
ical yet meaningless? Paul Davies [1] iden-
tifies this abstract–concrete dichotomy as a
fundamental problem of information. Carlo
Rovelli [2], meanwhile, also highlighted this
gap between information as a physical phe-
nomenon and information with meaning. In
his paper, Rovelli [2] outlines how to close
this gap. This commentary examines Rov-
elli’s claims and asks whether his concept of
information offers a fundamental solution to
the abstract–concrete dichotomy, the concept
of information in general, and the concept of
meaningful information. Note that this dis-
cussion is intentionally brief, so several ideas
are only conveyed through references and not
elaborated in detail.
Rovelli [2] presents a “purely physical defi-
nition of meaningful information,” but how?
First, Rovelli uses Shannon’s theory of com-
munication (TOC) concept for measuring in-
formation and derives from this the “relative
information” between two physical systems.
He denotes it as “a purely physical version
of the notion of information” or a purely
“physical correlation.” But what is Rovelli’s
pure correlation? Pure correlation is de-
fined as the correlation of two probability
distributions (in compatible state spaces) or
as the difference between (information) en-
tropies of two probability distributions. As
Rovelli states, “[these] correlations can exist
because of physical laws or because of spe-
cific physical situations, or arrangements or
mechanisms. . . ” Therefore, a “purely physi-
cal correlation,” which is information for Rov-
elli, represents some (co-)dependence of the
(two) states of physical systems. In other
words, the two states are correlated, and the
entropy difference or joint probability are for-
mal expressions of this relation.
Second, Rovelli proposes (following the
Wolpert and Kolchinsky paper [3]) that Dar-
winian evolution provides the essential mech-
anisms to endow the natural/physical pro-
cesses related to the evolution of organisms
with some notion of meaning, purpose, and
intentionality. From this viewpoint, environ-
mental/physical stimulus has meaning for an
organism if it increases its chances of its sur-
vival (or preservation). As a very rudimen-
tary example, if bacteria are able to avoid a
harmful environment by sensing it through
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some sort of physical stimuli, interpreting it
correctly, and initiating evasive action, it cre-
ates meaning out of the physical sensory in-
put. In other words, it creates meaningful
information for itself. This is how environ-
mental stimuli acquire meaning, intentional-
ity, and purpose. (In the original text [3], the
meaning of information is tied with an or-
ganism’s ability to stay outside the “thermal
equilibrium,” that is, to keep a low entropy
state). By combining a Darwinian-based in-
terpretation of meaning, purpose, and inten-
tionality with information perceived as a cor-
relation between physical states using rela-
tive information [4], Rovelli defines purely
physical meaningful information. In his own
words, he creates “the crucial first link of the
chain” for connecting physical information
with meaning, as expressed in the paper’s ti-
tle: “meaning=information + evolution” .
So, what is Rovelli’s “purely physical defi-
nition of meaningful information” ? Rov-
elli used Shannon’s information measure
— Shannon never defined information but
rather a measure of information and infor-
mation entropy—to define the relative infor-
mation (the information element of Rovelli’s
definition) and then applied this to the physi-
cal aspect of evolutionary processes, thus ob-
taining the Darwinian element responsible for
meaning in Rovelli’s definition. However, in
his definition, Rovelli implicitly adopts the
whole framework of Shannon’s communica-
tion model (TOC) and the formula for the
amount of information in messages between
agents (i.e., information entropy). Why is
this important? First, the model of rel-
ative information derived from Shannon’s
TOC information entropy implicitly includes
at its basis the concept of the communica-
tion model. This implies that (physical) in-
formation is created by agents or exchanged
between them, so the communication context
is essential for the creation of meaning.
Another consequence implied in Shannon’s
model of information entropy is the prob-
abilistic nature attributed to information.
This serves a purpose in the optimization of
communication channels, or it may be accept-
able in specific cases that deal with very large
state spaces, such as the entropy of a black
hole [10]. We can ask, however, is informa-
tion in its very essence really probabilistic, or
is probability introduced to characterize how
information is really an expression of the epis-
temic opaqueness of the phenomena (i.e., the
case under study) rather than a feature of the
information itself?
There is also a question as to whether we can
attribute meaning, intentionality, and pur-
pose to probabilistic evolutionary processes.
What do these terms mean in this context?
What is more, do we not indirectly invoke the
notion of intelligent design or God’s hand in
creation by assigning meaning, intentionality,
and purpose (even in a reduced form) to nat-
ural processes? Of course, we may propose
highly reductionist interpretations of these
terms, and this is indeed what Rovelli did,
but in this way, these terms would not mean
what they purport to denote and what they
would then denote in reality is unclear.
Why is such a (over) use of the terms’ mean-
ing, intentionality, and purpose not recom-
mended? This is because when claims of
meaning, even when qualified, are associ-
ated with physical or biochemical processes,
it distorts the meaning of meaning. These
claims reinterpret the very concept of mean-
ing, which in turn may result, as is often the
case, in misinterpretations or misuse. There
is also always a danger of running the Sokal
affair in reverse. As a reminder, the Sokal
affair involved using terms from one domain
(e.g., physics, mathematics) in another, com-
pletely different context (e.g., social sciences,
philosophy).
We can observe that the author sensed he was
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on rather unstable grounds when blending the
TOC, physical phenomenon, meaning, and
intentionality, and he admits that his ideas
are merely proposals. Rovelli also points out
that this sort of meaning is a very primitive
one. The distance between the theoretical
models of the cosmos or Bach’s fugues and
a bacteria’s reaction to its environment are
light years apart, yet the reaction of the bac-
teria is, at its core, the seed for others. This
is conceptual quicksand for sure. Granting
meaning, intentionality, and so on to natu-
ral biological systems is, it seems an anthro-
pomorphization of nature. Restricting these
concepts to people runs the risk of incurring
human exceptionalism. The proper approach
is probably somewhere in the mythical mid-
dle, such as recognizing the exceptional hu-
man cognitive ability but viewing it as an
emerging function in a higher level biological
system. Another approach is to simply bite
the bullet and stick to more widely recognized
definitions.
Summing up Rovelli’s view, information is
correlation (pure correlation) between two
physical systems (as defined above) and
meaningful information is pure correlation in
the above sense within the context of an evo-
lutionary process being viewed as a commu-
nication process. This approach excludes, in
principle, the concept of information where it
is an intrinsic, not agent-relative, feature of
physical phenomena.
Rovelli’s meaningful information is certainly
an interesting idea and worthy of study. How-
ever, its novelty and import must be placed in
perspective. Shannon’s TOC naturally lends
itself to the concept of physical information in
evolutionary processes, because communica-
tion is a physical process at its foundations
and the very essence of evolution is based
on communication between the environment
and living agents. It must be said, how-
ever, that Shannon probably did not intend
to make an association between purely phys-
ical processes, evolution and information [7].
As we said, Darwinian evolution is in some
sense just a specific instance of a communi-
cation model being adopted for an evolution-
ary process. It is rather obvious that we are
the creations of evolution (and therefore cre-
ated through communication), and our cogni-
tive faculties are the product of this (see e.g.,
Nagel [5], Searle [6]).
Now, does this proposal solve the “gap” prob-
lem? Perhaps it does, but at the cost of
stretching the meaning of meaning itself and
forcing the concept of physical information
into the TOC framework. Is this a price we
want to pay, though? It seems that the solu-
tion to the “gap” lies somewhere else.
It has been suggested that the ab-
stract–concrete dichotomy of information is
caused by a misconceptualization of what in-
formation is [8]. One possible solution to re-
solve this abstract–concrete tension could be
based on recognizing that information at the
fundamental level is an organization or other
form of physical phenomena [8], and it does
not require the communication model frame-
work to be defined, so there is no need for
the TOC. This information exists everywhere
where there is physical reality, as anything in
reality takes some form, so in this view, infor-
mation is fundamental. In addition, this in-
formation is ontologically objective in Searle’s
sense [6]—it exists independently of anyone
“sensing it” but is meaningless. The meaning
in, or of, information is created by a cogni-
tive agent, for an agent, or in the agent’s
cognitive system. From this perspective, the
dichotomy dissolves, because information is
fundamentally physical, but meaning is cre-
ated by an agent and stays with him or her.
Assuming that meaning and intentionality
are properties created, or attributed, by cog-
nitive capacities, the presence of an agent
with cognitive ability endows physical infor-
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mation with meaning. In other words, the
agent derives meaning from neutral physical
stimuli. Meaningful information is them sim-
ply agent-relative or ontologically subjective
[6], even if it is shared among many agents.
How meaning is created by cognitive agents is
not precisely known at this point, but we may
assume that meaning has a biological basis,
because cognition is a biological phenomenon.
We need to avoid dualism, however, because
this would take us into Never-never land of
Descartes.
Now, does this agent-originated meaning
correlate with physical information? Yes,
it does, because cognitive natural/biological
agents evolve to respond to the external en-
vironment by interpreting it as something
meaningful for them. However, can we as-
sign meaning to any response by a biological
agent to environmental stimuli like in [2]? If
we were to, we would run the risk of triv-
ializing the concept of meaning, because we
would assign meaning, knowledge, and intelli-
gence (or some derivatives thereof) to plants,
single-cell organisms, and so on, which is a
trend in biology that is actually happening
(see e.g., [9]). Can we really say that meaning
is a well-defined concept that spans the con-
tinuum from the primitive responses of simple
biological systems to complex human-based
meaning? We could say so, and some are in-
deed doing precisely this [9], but it is tan-
tamount to proposing some form of panpsy-
chism.
In summary, we can see how introducing
the concept of relative information based on
the TOC and associating with it a mean-
ing of sorts created through the evolution-
ary process does dissolve the alleged gap, al-
beit only superficially. Indeed, it prompts
more questions about meaning and informa-
tion, particularly physical information, than
it resolves. Introducing this new concept of
meaning does not necessarily help to explain
what comprises meaningful information and
what meaning is, and defining physical infor-
mation in the context of the TOC renders
physical information relative rather than ab-
solute (ontologically objective), which is what
physical phenomena like information are.
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